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GOOGLE AND FAIR USE
I. INTRODUCTION
GOOGLE IS ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE AND SUCCESSFUL U.S. COMPANIES in the new
millennium. Its growth has been staggering, whether measured by market capitali-
zation, revenue, profits, or the number of employees. It has been the subject of
countless newspaper and magazine articles, television news reports, blogs, and even
books.' Notwithstanding all this attention and scrutiny, the public and policymak-
ers have little awareness that the company's crown jewel-its search engine-is
heavily reliant on the fair use doctrine.2
This Article will explain the centrality of fair use to current search engine tech-
nology.' This Article will then discuss how the fair use doctrine will be litigated in
the Google Library Project.4 Lastly, the Article will discuss Europe's contrasting
hostility towards the copyright issues presented by Google.5
II. SEARCH ENGINE TECHNOLOGY
The first generation of Internet search technology involved directories. The Yahoo
directory, for example, was created by an army of human beings who surfed web-
sites and classified them based on their content.6 While such directories had the
virtue of reflecting human judgment,7 they were expensive to assemble and could
not keep pace with the explosive growth of the Internet.'
The second generation of search technology involved software "spiders" sent out
to "crawl" websites and copy metadata concerning the website's contents.9 A search
firm could compile a search database containing website metadata more quickly
and less expensively than it could create a directory reflecting human categoriza-
tions.'" However, website operators could easily deceive search engines dependent
on metadata by manipulating the metadata."
1. See, e.g., JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BusI-
NESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2005); Kevin J. Delaney, Google's Finance Chief to Resign, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 29, 2007, at B8; Who's Afraid of Google?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2007, at 9, 56-58.
2. See infra Parts III-V.
3. See infra Parts Il-IV.
4. See infra Part VI.
5. See infra Part VII.
6. Yahoo! Small Business, What's the Difference Between a Search Engine and a Directory?, http://
help.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2007); see also PETER MORVILLE ET AL., THE INTERNET SEARCHER'S HAND-
BOOK 95-97 (1996).
7. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 49 (1998).
8. See Search Engine History.com, History of Search Engines: From 1945 to Google 2007, http://
www.searchenginehistory.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
9. See generally NAT'L INFO. STANDARDS ORG., UNDERSTANDING METADATA (2004) (discussing metadata
and how it is used). See also BATTELLE, supra note 1, at 20-21.
10. See generally BATTELLE, supra note 1, at 39-63 (discussing the shift from directories to search engines).
11. See Google Corporate Information: Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/
tech.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
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This deficiency, and the steadily dropping cost of computer storage, led to the
third and current generation of search technology. Now, the software spiders copy
much of the content of the websites they crawl, rather than just the metadata. m2 In
order for search engine companies to remain at the forefront of their industry, each
must copy a large (and increasing) percentage of the entire World Wide Web every
few weeks." When a user enters a query into a search engine, the user receives back
relevant information based on the websites stored in the search engine's database.'
The search engine then produces a list of responsive sites ranked by an algorithm
that determines relevancy.'" The list of responsive sites that the user receives con-
tains links to the original site and to a "cache" copy stored in the search engine's
database.' 6 Searching the webpages, rather than just the metadata, allows search
firms to provide users with far more accurate responses. 7
III. SEARCH ENGINES AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Because neither the first nor the second generation search engine copied expression
protected by copyright, the search engine firm could not incur direct infringement
liability.'" At most, the search engine firm could be secondarily liable by virtue of
linking to infringing material. 9 The information location tool safe harbor of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act2" (DMCA) provided a notice and takedown re-
gime that adequately protected first and second generation search engines from this
liability risk.2'
However, as noted above, third generation search firms copy the actual webpages
into their search indices.22 Significantly, the search engines conduct this vast
amount of copying without the authority of the website operators.23 Although the
search engines will respect an exclusion header-a software "Do Not Enter" sign
posted by a website operator-the search engines do not ask for permission before
12. See id.
13. JONATHAN BAND, AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, THE GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT: THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 13
(2006).
14. Id.; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 711-13 (9th Cir. 2007) (providing an
overview of current search engine technology).
15. See Google Corporate Information, supra note 11.
16. BAND, supra note 13; see also Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 711-13.
17. See Google Corporate Information, supra note 11.
18. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
19. See Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 725-29.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000).
21. See Jonathan Band, Taro lsshiki & Anthony Reese, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 412, 415-18 (1998) (outlining the copyright infringement safe harbor principles of 17
U.S.C. § 512).
22. See supra Part 11.
23. BAND, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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they enter websites and copy the contents.24 Thus, the search engines potentially are
liable for direct infringement, not just secondary infringement."
Moreover, this wholesale copying of websites might not fall within the four cor-
ners of the § 512(d) information location tool safe harbor. 6 Section 512(d) applies
to infringement occurring "by reason of the provider referring or linking users to
an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or
hypertext link." 27 This list of activities does not explicitly include copying expres-
sion into a search database.2"
Yet, even if § 512(d) unquestionably applied to the full range of search engine
activities, search engines would still be subject to injunctions relating to the repro-
ductions they make during the course of performing their search function.2 9 Sec-
tion 512(d) prohibits monetary relief against an eligible service provider, but still
permits injunctive relief.3" Furthermore, a search engine is eligible for the § 512(d)
safe harbor only if it expeditiously removes material at the request of the copyright
owner, and meets a variety of other conditions.3 As a result, even with the DMCA's
protection, a search engine could still be required to remove information relating to
vast numbers of legitimate websites, to the extent that the search engine indexed
that information without the express permission of those websites' operators.32 For
this reason, search engines have relied upon another privilege afforded by the
Copyright Act: the fair use doctrine.3
IV. FAIR USE
The fair use doctrine is codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, which
provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determin-
24. Id. at 7.
25. See, e.g., Jesse M. Feder, Is Betarmax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of
Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859 (2004).
26. BAND, supra note 13, at 3-4.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000).
28. Id. While search firms take the position that the § 512(d) safe harbor provision applies to all the copies
a search engine makes in the course of its provision of information location services, to date no court has
interpreted § 512(d) in this manner. BAND, supra note 13, at 14.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d), (j).
30. Id. § 512(d).
31. Id.
32. BAND, supra note 13, at 13-14.
33. See infra Parts IV-V.
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ing whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.34
Congress first codified the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976," but
courts had been applying fair use at least since Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story's 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh.36 Judges and scholars have struggled to
categorize fair use. It has been called an affirmative defense,37 a user privilege," and
even an affirmative right. 9 Some scholars have viewed it as a solution to market
failure-as a means of permitting a use when the transaction costs were too great
relative to the use, e.g., a short quotation, or the copyright owner refused to license
the use, e.g., a parody.
41
Regardless of its categorization, fair use has a constitutional dimension. Scholars
have long noted a tension between the Constitution's intellectual property clause
4
'
and the First Amendment.42 After all, the intellectual property clause authorizes
Congress to provide copyright protection to authors, but the First Amendment
prohibits Congress from restraining speech.43 Litigants have attempted to exploit
this tension in an effort to convince courts to declare various provisions of the
34. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
35. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-18 (1976)).
36. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
37. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (citing Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992).
38. See Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink- Wrapping") of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 173, 175 (1999); see also Ass'N OF RES. LIBR., CONF. ON FAIR USE JOINT STATEMENT, CONFERENCE ON
FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS CONCLUDES WITHOUT CONSENSUS, http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/
copyresources/confu.shtml.
39. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (1lth Cir. 2001); David
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 714 n.227 (2000).
40. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 41, 43-47 (2001) (discussing the social functions of fair use). See generally Stanley F. Birch, Copyright
Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative, 54 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 139 (2007) (providing an overview of fair
use scholarship).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS, FREE EXPRESSION POLICY PROJECT, "THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USE-
FUL ARTS": WHY COPYRIGHT TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 8 (2d ed. 2003), available at http://
www.fepproject.org/policyreports/copyright2d.pdf; Birch, supra note 40, at 12 n.6.
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Copyright Act unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected such an
effort on the grounds that the "copyright scheme .. incorporates its own speech-
protective . ..safeguards."" In Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice Ginsburg specifically
identified fair use as one of copyright law's "built-in First Amendment
accommodations.
45
In other words, fair use is not simply an exception created by Congress during
the course of the political process that led to the Copyright Act of 1976, nor is it
just an enactment of a long-standing judicial principle of equity. Rather, fair use is
a constitutionally required structural element that harmonizes the copyright law
with the First Amendment. As the Eleventh Circuit's Judge Stanley Birch recently
argued in the Brace Lecture sponsored by the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., fair
use is essential to the constitutionality of the Copyright Act.46
Fair use also plays another constitutional role: it helps achieve the stated objec-
tive of the intellectual property clause-promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts47-by permitting socially beneficial uses that do not unreasonably
prejudice the copyright owner." The Supreme Court explains that fair use is an
"'equitable rule of reason' which 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law
is designed to foster."" Judge Kozinski writes that fair use, along with the idea/
expression and fact/expression dichotomies, are "necessary to maintain a free envi-
ronment in which creative genius can flourish."5 Paraphrasing the Supreme
Court's decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone,5 Judge Kozinski explains that these
limitations allow "much of the fruit of a creator's labor [to] be used by others
without compensation." 2 Judge Kozinski continues by stressing that this reuse "is
not some unforeseen byproduct of our intellectual property system; it is the sys-
tem's very essence."5" Judge Kozinski explains that "[c] ulture, like science and tech-
nology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who
came before."" The intellectual property system provides authors with an incentive
to create, but at the same time permits other authors to build on this creativity.
This "is the means by which intellectual property law advances the progress of
science and art.
55
44. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Birch, supra note 40.
47. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cd. 8.
48. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine ofFair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1188
(2000).
49. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
51. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
52. White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1513.
55. Id. at 1517.
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In sum, fair use is part of the constitutional fabric of the copyright law. Fair use
harmonizes the intellectual property clause with the First Amendment, and pro-
motes the progress of science and the useful arts by allowing new authors to build
on the work of earlier authors.
V. CASE LAW ADDRESSING FAIR USE AS IT APPLIES TO GOOGLE
A. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.
Google went public on August 19, 2004.56 But July 7, 2003 might be an even more
important date in Google's history. On that day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.57 The Kelly court was
the first appellate court to consider the lawfulness of a third generation search
engine. By concluding that the fair use doctrine permitted the copying performed
by search engines, the court gave a legal green light to the public's enormous in-
vestment in Google a year later.5"
Arriba Soft operated a search engine for Internet images.5 9 Arriba compiled a
database of images by copying pictures from websites, without the express authori-
zation of the website operators." Arriba reduced the full size images into
thumbnails, which it stored in its database.' In response to a user query, the Arriba
search engine displayed responsive thumbnails." If a user clicked on one of the
thumbnails, she was linked to the full size image on the original website from
which the image had been copied.63 Kelly, a photographer, discovered that some of
the photographs from his website were in the Arriba search database, and he sued
for copyright infringement.64 The lower court found that Arriba's reproduction of
the photographs was a fair use, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part.6"
With respect to the first of the four fair use factors, "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature,"' the Ninth Circuit
56. See Google Corporate Information, supra note 11; see also Editorial, Google Goes Public, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2004, at A22; Gary Rivlin, After Months of Hoopla, Google Debut Fits the Norm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2004, at C2 (discussing the first day of trading of Google stock).
57. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
58. Id. at 822.
59. Id. at 815.
60. Id.
61. id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
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acknowledged that Arriba operated its site for commercial purposes.67 However,
Arriba's use of Kelly's images
was more incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types
of commercial use. Arriba was neither using Kelly's images to directly promote
its web site nor trying to profit by selling Kelly's images. Instead, Kelly's images
were among thousands of images in Arriba's search engine database. Because
the use of Kelly's images was not highly exploitative, the commercial nature of
the use weighs only slightly against a finding of fair use.6"
The court then considered the transformative nature of the use-whether Ar-
riba's use "merely superseded the object of the originals or instead added a further
purpose or different character."69 The court concluded that
the thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images that served an en-
tirely different function than Kelly's original images. [While] Kelly's images are
artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic
experience[,] ... Arriba's search engine functions as a tool to help index and
improve access to images on the internet .... 70
Further, users were "unlikely to enlarge the thumbnails" to use them for aesthetic
purposes because they were of lower resolution and thus could not be enlarged
without significant loss of clarity.7' In distinguishing other judicial decisions, the
Ninth Circuit stressed that "[ti his case involves more than merely a retransmission
of Kelly's images in a different medium. Arriba's use of the images serves a different
function than Kelly's use-improving access to information on the internet versus
artistic expression."72 The court closed its discussion of the first fair use factor by
concluding that "Arriba's use of Kelly's images promotes the goals of the Copyright
Act and the fair use exception" because the thumbnails "do not supplant the need
for the originals" and "they benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering
techniques on the internet." 3
With respect to the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the Ninth Circuit observed that "'[wlorks that are creative in nature are closer to
the core of intended copyright protection than are more fact-based works.'"'
Moreover, "[p]ublished works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first
67. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 819.
73. Id. at 820.
74. Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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appearance of the artist's expression has already occurred."75 Kelly's works were
creative, but published.76 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the second
factor weighed "only slightly in favor of Kelly.""
The third fair use factor is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . . . ."" The Ninth Circuit recognized
that "copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use."79 Nonetheless,
the court stated that "the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and
character of the use."' Thus, "[ilf the secondary user only copies as much as is
necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh against him or
her." In Kelly, this factor weighed in favor of neither party:
[A]lthough Arriba did copy each of Kelly's images as a whole, it was reasonable
to do so in light of Arriba's use of the images. It was necessary for Arriba to
copy the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether
to pursue more information about the image or the originating web site. If
Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to identify it,
thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine.82
The Ninth Circuit decided that the fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,"83 weighed in favor of Ar-
riba.84 The court found that the Arriba "search engine would guide users to Kelly's
web site rather than away from it.""5 Additionally, the thumbnail images "would not
harm Kelly's ability to sell or license his full-sized images" because the low resolu-
tion of the thumbnails effectively prevented their enlargement.86
B. Field v. Google Inc.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelly in July 2003, obviously provided the search
industry in general, and Google in particular, with legal confidence concerning its
75. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)).
76. id.
77. Id.
78. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
79. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
80. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994)).
81. Id. at 820-21.
82. Id. at 821.
83. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
84. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 882.
85. Id. at 821.
86. Id. at 821-22.
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method of operation. 7 But it was not until January 2006 that a court ruled that
Google's own search activities fell within the fair use privilege.88
In Field v. Google,"9 an attorney named Blake Field brought a copyright infringe-
ment lawsuit against Google after it automatically copied and cached fifty-one
copyrighted stories he posted on his website.9° The court found that Field posted
the stories for the purpose of bringing copyright claims against Google: "Field de-
cided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against Google in the
hopes of making money from Google's standard practice" of caching the content it
spiders and presenting users with links to the cached copies." "Field created a ro-
bots.txt file for his site and set the permissions within this file to allow all robots to
visit and index . . . the site."92 Field intentionally chose not to use a "no archive"
metatag, which would have prevented Google from providing users with links to
the cache, because he wanted to "entrap" Google.9"
In his suit, Field argued that the Google Cache feature infringed his copyrights
because it allowed Google users to link to an archival copy of websites indexed by
Google.94 Field did not argue that Google infringed by copying his stories into its
index in the first place; he probably recognized that under Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
which is binding precedent on the federal court in Nevada, the copying and storing
of the stories was a fair use.95 Rather, Field's complaint centered on Google's serv-
ing the cache copy to users.96 In Kelly, by contrast, the user had "to go to Kelly's site
to see the full-sized image."97 The court granted summary judgment in favor of
Google on five independent bases, including fair use.9"
87. See supra Part V.A.
88. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006).
89. Id. at 1106.
90. Id. at 1110.
91. Id. at 1113.
92. Id. at 1114.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1109.
95. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); see also supra Part V.A.
96. Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 2-4, Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev.
2006) (No. CV-S-04-0413-RCJ-LRL).
97. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
98. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1109, 1123. The court relied on four additional bases for granting summary
judgment in favor of Google. First, the court found that serving a webpage from the Google Cache did not
constitute direct infringement by Google because it did not engage in any volitional activity with respect to
serving the cached webpage. Id. at 1115. Rather, the user initiated the serving of the cached copy by clicking on
the cache link. Id. Google's servers merely display the copy to the user by an automatic process. Id. Second, by
posting an "allow all" robot.txt header and then failing to set a "no archive" metatag, Field indicated that he
impliedly licensed search engines to permit users to access the cached copy. Id. at 1114-16. Third, Field was
estopped from asserting a copyright claim because he induced Google to infringe by using software code that
invited Google to scan and cache his website and then intentionally failed to instruct Google not to serve the
cached copies. Id. at 1116-17. Fourth, the Google Cache qualifies for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
section 512(b) caching "safe harbor" for online service providers. Id. at 1123-25.
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The Field court's fair use holding is significant in several respects. Most impor-
tantly, the court extended Kelly from the presentation of thumbnail images to the
presentation of the complete text of web sites.99 The court found that the display of
cached copies served a different purpose from the original work and therefore did
not supersede the original.'0 0 The cache copy allows users to access the work when
it no longer is available on the original site.'0 ' This is particularly significant for
academics and journalists. The cache copy allows users to detect changes to a web-
site.' O2 This can be important for political, educational, and legal reasons. The cache
copy also allows a user to understand why a page is responsive to a query, because
the queried term is highlighted in the copy.' The court concluded that the use is
transformative (even though the copy is identical to the original) because it serves a
different purpose from the original.'0 4 The court dismissed the argument that
Google was a commercial entity by stressing that there was no evidence that Google
profited from its use of Field's stories.' The court observed that his "works were
among billions of works in Google's database."0 6
With respect to the market impact of the cache copy, the court noted that Field
made his work available for free on the Internet, and thus there was no market
harm.0 7 Further, the court found that "there is no evidence ... of any market for
licensing search engines the right to allow access to Web pages through 'Cached'
links, or evidence that one is likely to develop."'00
Finally, the Field court considered a fifth fair use factor: "whether an alleged
copyright infringer has acted in good faith."0 9 The court found that because
Google was following industry practice when serving up cached copies, and dis-
abled the links to the cache as soon as Field filed his complaint, it acted in good
faith."0
C. The District Court Decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
Google and other search engines encountered a major road block when the federal
district court in Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc."' rejected Google's assertion of fair use."2
99. Id. at 1114.
100. Id. at 1118-19.
101. Id. at 1118.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1119.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1120.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1121.
108. Id. at 1122.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1122-23.
111. 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd in part and rev'd in part, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
112. Id. at 851.
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Perfect 10 published erotic photographs in a magazine and a website." 3 It claimed
that other websites copied and displayed its photographs without permission.' 4 In
the course of its search engine operations, Google automatically scanned the pho-
tographs on the infringing websites, stored them in its search database, displayed
thumbnails of these infringing images in response to search queries, and provided
links to the infringing sites." 5 Additionally, Google provided the AdSense service." 6
If a website was an AdSense partner, Google served ads to the website." 7 Although
AdSense and Google Search are distinct services, Google Search could lead a user to
a website that was an AdSense partner." Perfect 10 alleged that some of the in-
fringing sites to which Google linked were AdSense partners." 9 A final fact: a com-
pany called Fonestarz Media Limited licenses photos and makes them available for
download on cell phones.' Perfect 10 alleged that it had licensed its images to
Fonestarz for download onto cell phones.'' It further alleged that cell phone users
could download thumbnail Perfect 10 images from Google's site rather than from
Fonestarz.'22
Perfect 10 sued Google both for displaying thumbnail images of Perfect 10 pho-
tographs in response to search queries and for linking to sites where infringing
images were displayed.' Perfect 10 filed a motion for preliminary injunction,
which the court granted in part.'24 In ruling on the display of the thumbnail images
113. Id. at 831-32.
114. Id. at 837.
115. Id. at 833-34.
116. Id. at 834.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 846-47.
120. Id. at 832.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 832, 838.
123. Id. at 831.
124. Id. at 831, 859. The court's rulings on the linking to infringing sites touched on issues other than fair
use. Id. at 837-54. Perfect 10 argued that linking to an infringing site constituted both direct and secondary
infringement. Id. at 837. After all, Google's "in-line" link incorporated the content from the linked site, and
thus Google was engaging in an unlawful display of the content. Id. at 838-39. Google, on the other hand,
argued that it was just pointing to the linked site, and that the linked site, not Google, was displaying the
content. Id. After discussing the underlying technology, the court agreed with Google. Id. at 843.
Additionally, the court rejected Perfect 10's argument that Google was secondarily liable for providing
links to sites with infringing content. Id. at 852. With respect to contributory infringement, the court con-
cluded that providing an audience for the infringement-providing users a means of finding these infringing
sites-did not constitute material contribution to infringing activity. Id. at 856. The court observed that
"Google has not actively encouraged users to visit infringing third-party websites, and it has not induced or
encouraged such websites to serve infringing content in the first place." Id. The court stated that the "websites
existed long before Google Image Search was developed and would continue to exist were Google Image Search
shut down." Id.
Turning to vicarious liability, the court found that Google did not have the right and ability to control the
infringing activity on the third party sites. Id. at 856-58. Google did not control the environment in which the
websites operated, and could not render them inaccessible by means of other search engines. Id.
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in the search results, the court distinguished Kelly and found that Google's display
was likely not a fair use.'
Specifically, the court identified two features that differentiated this case from
Kelly: AdSense and Fonestarz. n6 In Kelly, Arriba Soft received no direct financial
benefit from the display of Kelly's photograph.'27 Here, by contrast, Google received
a financial benefit from the display of the Perfect 10 thumbnails because the
thumbnails led users to infringing sites from which Google profited via the Ad-
Sense program.' The court concluded that this made Google's use "more com-
mercial" than Arriba Soft's. 9
Moreover, in Kelly, the court found that Arriba Soft's display of thumbnails did
not harm the market for Kelly's work, in part because there was no market for the
licensing of thumbnail images of Western scenery, the subject of Kelly's photos. 3 °
But there appears to be an emerging market for thumbnail images of naked wo-
men. "' Fonestarz licenses photos and makes them available for download on cell
phones, where they are the same size as the thumbnails that Google displays.' 2 The
court found that it was possible that Google's display of the thumbnails would
interfere with the success of the Fonestarz service because cell phone users could
see the thumbnails through a Google image search for free.'33 Because of these
factors, the court concluded that Google was unlikely to prevail on its fair use
defense.'34
The district court's ruling concerning the display of thumbnails could have cre-
ated serious problems for search engines. The district court's analysis called into
question any search business model that relied on advertising tied to search re-
sults.'35 The district court distinguished Kelly by citing Google's AdSense program,
where Google serves advertising on websites that in theory users could access by
clicking on Google search results.'36 The district court evidently believed that ad-
vertising revenue tied in any manner to search results rendered Google's use far
more commercial than Arriba Soft's.'37 After all, AdSense and Google Search were
separate and distinct programs offered by Google, and it was merely coincidence
that a Google search result would lead a user to a website enrolled in the AdSense
125. Id. at 842, 851.
126. Id. at 846-47, 849.
127. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
128. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846-47.
129. Id. at 847.
130. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818, 821-22.
131. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
132. Id. at 849.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 851.
135. See id. at 845-51.
136. Id. at 846-47.
137. See id.
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program.'38 If any linkage between advertising revenue and search results, no mat-
ter how tenuous, rendered the copying performed by search engines unfair, then
advertising-based commercial search engines, which provide free access to users,
would be in serious jeopardy.
The district court also distinguished Kelly by pointing to the Fonestarz service,
which for a fee provided Perfect 10 images to cell phone users.'39 The district court
concluded that Google's display of Perfect 10 thumbnails undermined the market
for Fonestarz, thus tilting the fourth fair use factor against Google. 4 ° This analysis
casted doubt on an all image search. In the future, firms may seek to provide spe-
cialized image download services to cell phones, e.g., images of entertainers, ath-
letes, politicians, art, architecture, and animals. Each firm could claim that image
search results competed with its service.
D. The Ninth Circuit Decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
Fortunately for the search industry, on May 16, 2007, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc.'41 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's rejection of Google's fair use defense. 4 2 The Ninth Circuit strongly reaf-
firmed its holding in Kelly, and rejected the district court's holding that Kelly was
distinguishable due to the AdSense program and the cell phone downloads.'43 The
138. How Do Your Crawler and Site Diagnostic Reports Work?, https://www.google.comladsense/support/
bin/answer.pyanswer=43995&ctx=en:search&query-separate&topic=&type=f (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
139. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849, 851.
140. Id. at 851.
141. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). The case name is styled Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. because an
appeal in a related case involving Amazon was consolidated with Google's appeal. Id. at 712-13. Perfect 10 sued
Amazon for providing users with a link to Google search results. Id.
142. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling that Google did not display or distribute the full
sized images when it linked to them. Id. at 732-33. The Ninth Circuit, like the district court before it, looked
closely at the actual technology involved. Id. at 715-19. It noted that Google did not store a full-sized copy in
its server. Id. at 717. Instead, it provided HTML instructions that directed the user's browser to the third party
site that stored the full-sized image. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[piroviding these HTML instruc-
tions is not equivalent to showing a copy." Id.
With respect to vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Google did
not have the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity on the third-party websites. Id. at 729-31. The
court found that "Google cannot terminate those third-party websites or block their ability to 'host and serve
infringing full-size images' on the Internet." Id. at 731 (citation omitted).
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that Google's linking to third party sites
containing infringing content did not materially contribute to the infringement of the content. Id. at 729. The
Ninth Circuit stated:
There is no dispute that Google substantially assists websites to distribute their infringing copies to a
worldwide market and assists a worldwide audience of users to access infringing materials. We cannot
discount the effect of such a service on copyright owners, even though Google's assistance is available
to all websites, not just infringing ones. Applying our test, Google could be held contributorily liable
if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take
simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10's copyrighted works, and failed to take such
steps.
Id.
143. Id. at 720, 722-23.
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Ninth Circuit found that there was no evidence that the Google thumbnails super-
seded the Fonestarz cell phone downloads.'" Further, the court found no evidence
that AdSense revenue derived from infringing sites was commercially significant.'45
At the same time, the court held that Google's use of the thumbnails was "highly
transformative."'46 In fact, the court went so far as to say that "a search engine may
be more transformative than a parody," the quintessential fair use, "because a
search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody
typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work."'4 7
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit "conclude[d] that the significantly transformative
nature of Google's search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit, out-
weighs Google's superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this
case."'48 The Ninth Circuit stated that in reaching this conclusion, it was mindful
that the Supreme Court stressed "the importance of analyzing fair use flexibly in
light of new circumstances[,] ... especially during a period of rapid technological
change." 49
As noted above, the district court's rejection of Google's fair use defense on
account of its AdSense program threatened the advertisement-based business mod-
els of search engines.' Likewise, the district court's focus on the hypothetical harm
caused to the emerging adult cell phone download market endangered the entire
image search market because any photographer or visual artist could make the
same kind of assertion. The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court's fair use
holding, therefore, is critical to the future of search engines.
The Ninth Circuit made another important fair use holding. The district court
found that the cache copy made by a user's browser whenever he viewed a webpage
is likely a fair use.' The issue only arose because to prove secondary liability for
Google, Perfect 10 needed to show that there was an underlying direct infringe-
ment by a third person.'52 Perfect 10 argued that there were three possible direct
infringements: the third party websites' unauthorized display of Perfect 10's images;
users printing out images from these websites; and users making temporary copies
of these images in the random access memory (RAM) of their computers while
144. Id. at 722-23. The court found that "the significantly transformative nature of Google's search engine,
particularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs Google's superseding and commercial uses of the
thumbnails." Id. at 723.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 721.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 723.
149. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984)).
150. See supra Part V.C. Without a viable defense to copyright infringement, search engines may be forced
to seek revenue by charging users. This would dramatically change internet users' expectations.
151. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd in part and rev'd in
part, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
152. Id. at 851.
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viewing these sites.'53 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the unauthorized display of the
images was infringing, but found that there was no evidence that users printed out
the images.' 54 Further, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
RAM copies were a fair use. 5 While observers have long assumed that the RAM
copies made by users browsing the Internet was a fair use, this is the first time a
circuit court has so held. As with its ruling that a link is not a display, and that a
search engine's display of thumbnails is a fair use, the Ninth Circuit here has given
the green light to a basic Internet activity.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT
Google has undertaken an ambitious project of scanning into its search database
the full text of millions of books in library collections around the world.5 6 Publish-
ers and authors have sued Google for copyright infringement, and fair use will be
Google's main defense.5 7
The Google Book Search Project (formerly the Google Print Project) has two
facets: the Partner Program (formerly the Publisher Program) and the Library Pro-
ject.5 8 Under the Partner Program, a publisher controlling the rights in a book can
authorize Google to scan the full text of the book into Google's search database. In
response to a user query, the user receives bibliographic information concerning
the book as well as a link to relevant text.5 9 By clicking on the link, the user can see
the full page containing the search term, as well as a few pages before and after that
page.6 ' Links would enable the user to purchase the book from booksellers or the
publisher directly, or visit the publisher's website.'6' Additionally, the publisher
would share in contextual advertising revenue if the publisher has agreed for ads to
be shown on their book pages.'62 Publishers can remove their books from the
153. Id. at 837.
154. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 718-19.
155. Id. at 726.
156. Google Book Search Library Project, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2007).
157. See, e.g., Complaint, The McGraw-Hill Cos., Pearson Educ., Inc., Penguin Group (USA) Inc., Simon &
Schuster, Inc., and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8881, 2005 WL 2778878 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2005) [hereinafter Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, The Author's Guild, Associational Plaintiff, Her-
bert Mitgang, Betty Miles and Daniel Hoffman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136, 2005 WL 2463899 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Class Action Com-
plaint]. For a more detailed discussion of the Google Library Project and related fair use issues, see Jonathan
Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLAGIARY: CROss-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN PLAGIA-
RISM, FABRICATION, AND FALSIFICATION (Advance Online Copy) 1 (2006), available at http://quod.lib.umich.
edu/p/plag/images/5240451.0001.002.pdf.
158. Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/about.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
159. Google Book Search Tour, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/book-search_tour/books3.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2007).
160. Google Book Search, supra note 158.
161. Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 156.
162. Google Book Search Tour, supra note 159.
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Partner Program at any time.'63 The Partner Program raises no copyright issues
because it is conducted pursuant to an agreement between Google and the
copyright holder.
A. The Library Project
Under the Library Project, Google plans to scan into its search database materials
from an ever-growing list of research libraries.'64 In response to search queries,
users will be able to browse the full text of public domain materials. 6 However, for
books still under copyright, users will be able to see only a few sentences on either
side of the search term-what Google calls a "snippet" of text.'66 Users will not see a
few pages, as under the Partner Program, nor the full text, as for public domain
works. Indeed, users will never see even a single page of an in-copyright book
scanned as part of the Library Project.'67
Moreover, if a search term appears many times in a particular book, Google will
display no more than three snippets, thus preventing the user from viewing too
much of the book for free. 6 ' Finally, Google will not display any snippets for cer-
tain reference books, such as dictionaries, where the display of even snippets could
harm the market for the work.'69 The text of the reference books will still be
scanned into the search database, but in response to a query the user will only
receive bibliographic information. 7 ° The page displaying the snippets will indicate
the closest library containing the book, as well as where the book can be purchased,
if that information is available.' 7 '
Because of non-disclosure agreements between Google and the libraries, many
details concerning the project are not available. It appears that Google will scan
only public domain materials from several of the participating libraries, while it
will scan both public domain and in-copyright books at Michigan, California, and
Stanford.
163. Google Book Search Help Center, http://books.google.comlsupport/bin/answer.py?answer=43756&
topic=9011 (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
164. The research libraries, as of September 18, 2007, include Bavarian State Library, Committee on Institu-
tional Cooperation, Cornell University Library, Ghent University Library, Harvard University, Keio University
Library, Oxford University, Princeton University, Stanford University, The National Library of Catalonia, The
New York Public Library, University of California, University Complutense of Madrid, University Library of
Lausanne, University of Michigan, University of Texas-Austin, University of Virginia, and University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison. Google Book Search Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2007).
165. Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 156.
166. Id.
167. Displays of the different treatments can be found at Google's Book Search Library Project webpage. See
supra note 156.
168. Google Book Search, supra note 158.
169. Posting of Ryan Sands to Inside Google Book Search: From the Mail Bag: Four Book Views, http://
booksearch.blogspot.com/2006/07/from-mail-bag-four-book-views.html (July 5, 2006, 16:41 EST).
170. Id.
171. Google Book Search, supra note 158.
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As part of Google's agreement with the participating libraries, Google will pro-
vide each library with a digital copy of the books in its collection scanned by
Google' 72 Under the agreement between Google and the University of Michigan,
the University agrees to use its copies only for purposes permitted under the Copy-
right Act.' 73 If any of these lawful uses involve posting all or part of a library copy
on the University's website-for example, posting the full text of a public domain
work-the University agrees to limit access to the work and to use technological
measures to prevent the automated downloading and redistribution of the work.'74
Another, possible use described by the University is keeping the copies in a re-
stricted (or "dark") archive until the copyright expires or the copy is needed for
preservation purposes.' 5
In response to criticism from groups such as the American Association of Pub-
lishers and the Authors Guild, Google adopted an opt-out policy.'76 If the publisher
or author of a particular title asked Google not to scan that particular title, Google
would respect that request, even if the books were in the collection of one of the
participating libraries.'77 Thus, Google provides a copyright owner with three
choices with respect to any work: it can participate in the Partner Program, in
which case it would share in revenue derived from the display of pages from the
work in response to user queries; it can let Google scan the book under the Library
Project and display snippets in response to user queries; or it can opt-out of the
Library Project, in which case Google will not scan its book.
B. The Litigation
On September 20, 2005, the Authors Guild and several individual authors sued
Google for copyright infringement. 7 The lawsuit was styled as a class action on
behalf of all authors similarly situated. A month later, on October 19, 2005, five
publishers-McGraw-Hill, Pearson, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley &
Sons-sued Google."7 9 The authors requested damages and injunctive relief' The
publishers, in contrast, only requested injunctive relief.'' Neither group of plain-
172. Google Book Search Help Center-Do the Libraries Get a Copy of the Book?, http://
books.google.com/support/bin/answer.pyanswer=43751 (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
173. See Cooperative Agreement by and between Google Inc. and the Regents of the University of Mich./
University Library, Ann Arbor Campus, Aug. 2005, available at http://lib.umich.edu/mdp/
umgooglecooperativeagreement.html.
174. Id.
175. UM Library/Google Digitization Partnership FAQ, Aug. 2005, http://www.lib.umich.edu/staff/google
public/faq.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
176. Google Book Search Help Center, supra note 163.
177. See id. Because the author, the publisher, or a third party can own the copyright in a work, this Article
will refer to "owners."
178. Class Action Complaint, supra note 157, at *1.
179. Complaint, supra note 157, at 1.
180. Class Action Complaint, supra note 157, at *11-13.
181. Complaint, supra note 157, at 14.
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tiffs moved for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Neither
group sued the libraries for making the books available to Google.
The Library Project involves three actions that raise copyright questions. First,
Google copies the full text of books into its search database.'82 Second, Google
makes and provides each library with a digital copy of each book made available by
that library." 3 Third, in response to user queries, Google presents users with a few
sentences from the stored text." 4 Because the amount of expression presented to
the user is de minimus, this third action probably would not lead to liability. Be-
cause the libraries will use their copies for noncommercial preservation purposes,
Google has a strong fair use defense with respect to making these copies. Perhaps
for this reason, the lawsuits focus on the first issue, Google's copying of the full text
of books into its search database.1
8 5
As noted above, Google honors a request from the author or the publisher not to
scan its book. 6 The owners, however, insist that the burden should not be on
them to request Google not to scan a particular work; rather, the burden should be
on Google to request permission to scan the work. According to Pat Schroeder,
Association of American Publishers President, Google's opt-out procedure "shifts
the responsibility for preventing infringement to the copyright owner rather than
the user, turning every principle of copyright law on its ear."'8 7 The owners assert
that under copyright law, the user can copy only if the owner affirmatively grants
permission to the user-that copyright is an opt-in system, rather than an opt-out
system. Thus, as a practical matter, the entire dispute between the owners and
Google boils down to who should make the first move: should Google have to ask
permission before it scans, or should the owner have to tell Google that it does not
want the work scanned.
C. Google's Fair Use Argument
The owners are correct that copyright typically is an opt-in system, and that Google
is copying vast amounts of copyrighted material without authorization. Google re-
sponds that this copying is permitted under the fair use doctrine.88 The critical
question is whether the fair use doctrine excuses Google's copying."9
182. Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 156.
183. Google Book Search Help Center-Do the Libraries Get a Copy of the Book?, supra note 172.
184. Google Book Search, supra note 158.
185. Class Action Complaint, supra note 157, at )6, *9.
186. See supra text accompanying note 177.
187. Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Google Library Project Raises Serious Questions for Publishers
and Authors (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfn?PressRelease
ArticlelD=274.
188. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
189. In its answer to the Authors Guild lawsuit, Google raised numerous additional defenses, including
merger doctrine, scenes d faire, failure to comply with copyright registration formalities, lack of suitability for
class action treatments, and the plaintiffs' lack of standing. Answer, Jury Demand, and Affirmative Defenses of
Defendant Google Inc., The Author's Guild, Associational Plaintiff, Herbert Mitgang, Betty Miles and Daniel
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Google probably will attempt to convince the court that the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sions in Kelly and Amazon.com control this case. Although Google operates the
program for commercial purposes, it is not attempting to profit from the sale of a
copy of any of the books scanned into its database, and thus its use is not highly
exploitative. 9 ° Like the Arriba and Google Image search engines, Google's use here
is transformative in that Google is creating a tool that makes "the full text of all the
world's books searchable by anyone."'' The tool will not supplant the original
books because it will display only a few sentences in response to user queries. Like
Arriba and Google Image Search, the Library Project involves only published
works.'92 While some of the works included in the Library Project will be creative,
most will be non-fiction. 9 '
Similar to the search engines in Kelly and Amazon.com, Google's copying of en-
tire books into its database is reasonable because it allows the search engines to
operate effectively. After all, the purpose is the effective operation of the search
engine; searches of partial text necessarily would lead to incomplete results. Moreo-
ver, unlike Arriba and Google Image Search, Google will not provide users with a
copy of the entire work, but only with a few sentences surrounding the search
term.'94 And if a particular term appears many times in the book, the search engine
will allow the user to view only three instances-thereby preventing the user from
accessing too much of the book.9 '
Finally, as with the Arriba and Google Image search engine, it is hard to imagine
how the Library Project could actually harm the market for books, given the lim-
ited amount of text a user will be able to view. To be sure, if a user could view (and
print out) many pages of a book, it is conceivable that the user would rely upon the
search engine rather than purchase the book. Similarly, under those circumstances,
libraries might direct users to the search engine rather than purchase expensive
reference materials. But when the user can access only a few sentences before and
Hoffman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Google Inc., Civil Action No. 05 CV
8136 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2005). In the Publishers' suit, Google raised many of these defenses, as well as
license to scan and the publishers' lack of ownership of electronic rights. See Answer, Jury Demand, and
Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google Inc., The McGraw-Hill Cos., Pearson Educ., Inc., Penguin Group
(USA) Inc., Simon & Schuster, Inc., and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Google Inc., Civil Action No. 05 CV 8881
(JES) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005).
190. In Field v. Google Inc., the court dismissed the argument that Google was a commercial entity by
stressing that there was no evidence that Google profited from using Field's stories. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120
(D. Nev. 2006). As noted above, the court observed that his works were among the billions of works in
Google's database. Id. In the Library Project cases, Google will be able to make the same argument with respect
to any one owner.
191. Posting of Adam M. Smith to Official Google Blog: Making Books Easier to Find, http://goog-
leblog.blogspot.com/2005/08/making-books-easier-to-find.html (Aug. 12, 2005, 16:31 EST).
192. See Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 156.
193. Jonathan Band, Copyright Owners v. The Google Print Library Project, E-COMMERCE L. & POL'Y, Aug.
2005, available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint-EntLaw.pdf.
194. Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 156.
195. Google Book Search, supra note 158.
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after the search term, any displacement of sales is unlikely. Moreover, the Library
Project may actually benefit the market for the book by identifying it to users and
demonstrating its relevance. This is particularly important for the vast majority of
boo-'_s not well publicized by their publishers. Google will encourage users to ob-
tain a hard copy of the book by providing a link to information on book borrowing
or purchase information."'
D. The Owners' Response to Google's Fair Use Argument
The owners have four responses to the Kelly and Amazon.com precedents.'97
1. Quality of Copy
First, the owners note that Arriba and Google Image Search stored a compressed,
low-resolution version of each image, while here Google will store the full text of
each book.198 This seems to be a distinction without a difference because Arriba
and Google Image Search had to make a high-resolution copy before compressing
it. Furthermore, the low-resolution image Arriba and Google Image Search dis-
played to users represents far more of the work than the snippets Google will dis-
play to its Library Project users. In any event, neither the scanned copy nor the
snippets supplant the market for the original work.'99
2. Internet Environment
Second, the owners suggest that Kelly and Amazon.com are distinguishable because
they involved the copying of digital images on the Internet, while here Google will
be digitizing analog works."' If an owner decides to place a work on a website, the
owner knows that the website will be "crawled" by a software "spider" sent out by a
search engine, and the owner knows that the spider will copy the work into its
search index. 2°' Thus, by placing the work on the website, the owner has given a
search engine an implied license to copy the work into its search database.2 °2 By
196. Posting of Adam M. Smith to Official Google Blog, supra note 191.
197. The responses are based on arguments that owners' representatives have made at a series of debates on
the Google Library Project in which the author of this Article participated. See, e.g., Allan Adler, The Google
Library Project, MEDIA L. RES. CTR. BULL., Dec. 2006, at 73, 76 n.7 (2006); Solveig Singleton et al., Gutenberg
Meets Google: The Debate About Google Print, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., Jan. 2006, available at http://
pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl3.lgoogetranscript.pdf; see also Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Fair Use Hearing].
198. Singleton et al., supra note 197, at 3, 13.
199. Id. at 22. Additionally, in Field v. Google Inc., the court found Google's presentation of caches of the
full text of Field's stories to be a fair use. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006).
200. Singleton et al., supra note 197, at 13.
201. Fair Use Hearing, supra note 197, at 32 (testimony of Jonathan Band).
202. Id. at 63 (testimony of Paul Aiken).
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contrast, the author or publisher of a book has not given an implied license for the
book to be scanned. °3
Google has three possible responses to this argument. One, Kelly makes no refer-
ence to an implied license; its fair use analysis did not turn on an implied license.0 4
Two, this argument suggests that works uploaded onto the Internet are entitled to
less protection than analog works."' This runs contrary to the entertainment in-
dustry's repeated assertion that copyright law applies to the Internet in precisely the
same manner as it applies to the analog environment.2 6
Three, Google can argue that its opt-out feature constitutes a similar form of
implied license. A critical element of the implied license argument with respect to
material on the Internet is the copyright owner's ability to use an "exclusion
header."" 7 In essence, an exclusion header is a software "Do Not Enter" sign that a
website operator can place on its website. If a search engine's spider detects an
exclusion header, it will not copy the website into the search index.06 Thus, if a
website operator places content on the Internet without an exclusion header, the
search engine can assume that the operator has given it an implied license to copy
the website.2 9 Similarly, Google can argue that any owner that has not opted out
has given it an implied license to scan.
3. Licensing
The owners argue that the Library Project is distinguishable from Kelly because the
Library Project restricts owners' ability to license their works to search engine prov-
iders. l However, the existence of the Partner Program, which involves licensing,
demonstrates that the Library Project does not preclude lucrative licensing arrange-
ments. By participating in the Partner Program, publishers receive revenue streams
not available to them under the Library Project. Google presumably prefers for
203. See id.
204. See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-18. The implied license argument did not apply in Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc. because the websites from which Google copied the Perfect 10 images infringed Perfect 10's copy-
right and did not have the authority to license Google's use, either implicitly or explicitly. 416 F. Supp. 2d 828,
856-58 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd in part and rev'd in part, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th
Cir. 2007).
205. Singleton et al., supra note 197, at 13.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 19-20.
208. Fair Use Hearing, supra note 197, at 34 (prepared statement of Jonathan Band on behalf of
NetCoalition).
209. In Field v. Google Inc., Google raised implied license as a defense. 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. But,
Google's implied license argument in Field does not support the owners' attempt to distinguish Kelly on the
basis of the unique characteristics of spidering the Web. In Field, the court treated implied license and fair use
as distinct defenses. Id. at 1109. Thus, the absence of an implied license for the scanning in the Library Project
does not weaken Google's fair use defense based on Kelly. Moreover, Field used a software header that specifi-
cally invited Google's spider to crawl his website. Id. at 1114. There is no evidence that Kelly made a similar
invitation to Arriba Soft. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003).
210. Fair Use Hearing, supra note 197, at 97-98 (letter from Peter laszi).
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publishers to participate in the Partner Program because Google saves the cost of
digitizing the content if publishers provide Google with the books in digital format.
And Google made it clear that it is willing to upgrade a book from the Library
Project to the Partner Program upon the owner's request.2 '
Furthermore, Yahoo announced the formation of the Open Content Alliance,
which will include works licensed by their owners, nearly a year after Google an-
nounced the Library Project." 2 Google's Library Project obviously did not deter
Yahoo from adopting a different business model based on licensing.
Significantly, the Library Project will not compete with a business model involv-
ing licensed works because such a model will probably show more than just snip-
pets. While the Library Project will help users identify the entire universe of
relevant books, a model with licensed works will provide users with deeper expo-
sure to a much smaller group of books." 3 Each business model will satisfy different
needs. Stated differently, the Library Project targets the indexing market, while
other online digitization projects aim at the sampling market."4 By concentrating
on the indexing market, the Library Project will not harm the sampling market.
Further, even if the owners succeed in showing that the Library Project's harm to
the indexing market is not completely speculative,"5 in a recent decision the Sec-
ond Circuit suggested that courts should not consider the loss of licensing revenue
that the copyright owner could have obtained from "a transformative market." The
court stated:
[W]e hold that DK's use of BGA's images is transformatively different from
their original expressive purpose. In a case such as this, a copyright holder
cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely "by developing or
licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other transform-
ative uses of its own creative work." "Copyright owners may not preempt ex-
ploitation of transformative markets .... "Since DK's use of BGA 's images falls
within a transformative market, BGA does not suffer market harm due to the
loss of license fees.216
211. Posting of Adam M. Smith to Official Google Blog, supra note 191.
212. Press Release, Yahoo! Media Relations, Global Consortium Forms Open Content Alliance to Bring
Additional Content Online and Make It Searchable (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/
release I 269.html.
213. Fair Use Hearing, supra note 197, at 67 (prepared statement of Paul Aiken on behalf of the Authors
Guild) ("And a negotiated license could pave the way for a real online library-something far beyond the
excerpts Google intends to offer through its Google Library program.").
214. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005).
215. As noted above, the court in Field v. Google Inc. found that "there is no evidence before the Court of
any market for licensing search engines the right to allow access to Web pages through 'Cached' links, or
evidence that one is likely to develop." 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006).
216. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).
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Under this reasoning, the owners' hypothetical loss of revenue from the licensing of
indexing rights should not enter into the fair use calculus." 7
Finally, even if the court decided to include the loss of licensing revenue into its
fair use analysis, it likely would be influenced by the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Kelly that "the significantly transformative nature of Google's search engine, partic-
ularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs Google's superseding and commercial
uses of the thumbnails in this case. "218
4. Legal Error
The copyright owners' final response to Kelly and Amazon.com is that they were
wrongly decided.1 9 In other words, the Ninth Circuit made a mistake. The authors
and publishers sued Google in federal court in New York, part of the Second Cir-
cuit.125 While the trial court in New York may look to Kelly and Amazon.com for
guidance, Kelly and Amazon.corn are not binding precedent in the Second Circuit.
Similarly, when the case is appealed to the Second Circuit, the Second Circuit will
be interested in how the Ninth Circuit handled similar cases, but it is free to con-
duct its own analysis.
The owners suggest that the trial court will be influenced by an earlier decision
in the same district: UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.22 MP3.com established
a "space-shift" service that allowed people who purchased a CD to access the music
on the CD from different locations.222 MP3.com copied several thousand CDs into
its server, and then provided access to an entire CD to a subscriber who demon-
strated that he possessed a copy of the CD.223 MP3.com argued that the copies it
made on its server constituted fair use. 2 4 The court rejected the argument and
assessed millions of dollars of statutory damages against MP3.com. 2" The owners
might try to suggest that MP3.corn demonstrates that for a work to be "trans-
formed" in the Second Circuit for purposes of the first fair use factor, the work
217. The owners could argue that the Library Project might deprive them of the promotional value of their
works, e.g., steering traffic away from their websites were they to offer search capability. See Video Pipeline, Inc.
v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 202 (3d Cir. 2003). Interpreting the fourth fair use factor to
incorporate promotional value of this sort significantly limits the utility of the fair use privilege because every
work theoretically has some promotional value. Additionally, if a particular owner believes that a search index
of the works it owns has promotional value, it can simply opt-out of the Library Project. Singleton et al., supra
note 197, at 13. In contrast, Video Pipeline did not permit Disney to opt-out of its service displaying film
trailers. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 195.
218. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 723 (9th Cir. 2007).
219. Singleton et al., supra note 197, at 13.
220. Id. at 13-14.
221. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
222. Id. at 351.
223. Id. at 350.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 352.
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itself must be changed, as in a parody. Under this reasoning, a mere repurposing of
the work is insufficient to render a use transformative.
Google will contend that MP3.com is easily distinguishable by claiming that its
use is far more transformative than MP3.com's-it is creating a search index, while
MP3.com simply retransmitted copies in another medium. Additionally, Google
will claim that its use will not harm any likely market for the books-there is no
market for licensing books for inclusion in digital indices of the sort envisioned by
Google. In contrast, MP3.com's database clearly could harm markets for online
music, which the plaintiffs had already taken steps to enter.
Google also will insist that the Ninth Circuit correctly decided Kelly and Perfect
10. It will point to the Ninth Circuit's heavy reliance in Kelly on the Supreme
Court's most recent fair use decision.226 Kelly noted that the Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. held that "[t]he more transformative the new work, the less
important the other factors, including commercialism, become."2 7 Likewise, Kelly
cited Campbell for the proposition that "the extent of permissible copying varies
with the purpose and character of the use."22 And Kelly followed Campbell's con-
clusion that "[a] transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the
market of the original than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work." '229
Perhaps most importantly, Kelly repeated the Supreme Court's articulation in
Campbell and Stewart v. Abend23 of the objective of the fair use doctrine: "This
exception 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos-
ter." 23"' Google will contend that the Library Project is completely consistent with
this objective in that it will ensure that creative accomplishments do not fade into
obscurity. Because the Ninth Circuit so closely followed Campbell, and because the
Second Circuit is also obligated to follow Campbell, Google will urge the Second
Circuit to conduct a fair use analysis similar to the Ninth Circuit's.
The owners' contention that the Second Circuit applies a different standard for
transformation took a blow in May 2006, when the Second Circuit issued its deci-
sion in Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.232 Dorling Kindersley
(DK) published a coffee table biography of the Grateful Dead with over two-thou-
sand different images.2 3 Among these were seven posters whose copyright was
owned by Bill Graham Archives (BGA).2 "4 BGA sued for infringement, but the Dis-
226. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
227. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
228. Id. at 820 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87).
229. Id. at 821 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591).
230. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
231. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399
(9th Cir. 1997)).
232. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
233. Id. at 607.
234. Id.
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trict Court found that DK's use was fair.23 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding
that DK's inclusion of reduced images of the posters in a new work was transform-
ative.3 6 The court noted that
DK's purpose in using the copyrighted images at issue in its biography of the
Grateful Dead is plainly different from the original purpose for which they
were created. Originally, each of BGA's images fulfilled the dual purpose of
artistic expression and promotion .... In contrast, DK used each of BGA's
images as historical artifacts to document and represent the actual occurrence
of Grateful Dead concert events featured on [its] timeline.237
Thus, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit in Kelly, focused on the repurpos-
ing of the original work, rather than on changes to the work itself.3
Further strengthening the transformational nature of DK's use was "the manner
in which DK displayed the images." '239 The court noted that DK reduced the size of
the reproductions, and cited Kelly as authority for the transformational nature of
reproductions.24 The court further noted that BGA's images "constitute an incon-
sequential portion" of the book.24 These factors are present in the Google Library
Project as well-Google displays only snippets, which reveal far less of a work than
a thumbnail. Moreover, any one work constitutes an inconsequential portion of the
Google search index. In sum, the BGA decision suggests that a court in the Second
Circuit would find Google's use transformative.242
VII. EUROPEAN HOSTILITY TO SEARCH ENGINES
It is no accident that the world's leading search engines are all based in the United
States; fair use provides a far more fertile legal environment for innovation than
regimes with a handful of specific exceptions." 3 However, as Google and its U.S.
search engine competitors expand their operations globally, they will increasingly
expose themselves to infringement liability overseas.
While the fair use doctrine in the United States has allowed for the explosive
growth of the Google, Yahoo, Ask, and MSN search engines, the legal environment
235. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd,
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
236. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615.
237. Id. at 609.
238. Id. at 608.
239. Id. at 611.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. The Bill Graham Archives court also cited Kelly twice in its discussion of the third fair use factor. Id. at
613. Given the Second Circuit's extensive reliance on Kelly, the owners will not be able to marginalize it as an
aberrant Ninth Circuit decision. See id.
243. British Commonwealth countries have adopted the U.K. concept of "fair dealing," which typically is
much narrower than the U.S. concept of"fair use." Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 29 (Eng.).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
JONATHAN BAND
in the European Union has been much more hostile to search engines. The relevant
EU Directives and their national implementations do not appear to contain excep-
tions as flexible as § 107 of the United States Code.2" The EU Copyright Directive's
exception for temporary and incidental copies of no economic significance proba-
bly would not shield search engines from liability for the copies they make.245 Simi-
larly, the EU E-Commerce Directive has safe harbors for mere-conduit, system
caching, and hosting functions, but not for information location tools.246 Addition-
ally, it is far from clear that the caching safe harbor would apply to the kind of
caching performed by search engines. The U.K. copyright law has a fair dealing
exception, but it is narrower than fair use; it is limited to noncommercial uses for
research or study.47
European courts also have shown little sympathy to search engines. Several Euro-
pean courts have found search engines' gathering of information from websites to
violate national implementations of the EU Database Directive.24 And in February
2007, the Belgian Court of First Instance specifically found that Google's caching of
websites, and subsequent display of the cache copies to users, infringes copy-
rights. 249 The court considered, and rejected, the various defenses Google raised,
including the exception for news reporting.250 Moreover, the court found that
GoogleNews infringed copyrights and violated the Database Directive by copying
and displaying the headlines and lead sentences from articles.25 '
The absence of a broad fair use exception in European nations suggests that their
copyright laws would not permit the scanning of a library of books. For this reason,
in Europe Google will scan only public domain books. Fortunately for researchers
of books published outside of the United States, the U.S. libraries participating in
the Google Library Project possess vast collections of books published around the
world. Thus, these important resources will be included in the Google search
database, notwithstanding the absence of a fair use doctrine in their country of
origin.252
244. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
245. Council Directive 2001/29, The Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in
the Information Society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
246. Council Directive 2000/31, Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Elec-
tronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 13-15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12-13 (EC).
247. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 29 (Eng.).
248. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Database Right File, INST. FOR INFO. L., Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.ivir.nl/
fles/database/index.html.
249. SCRL Copiepresse v. Google, Gen. Role No. 06/10.928/C, 22 (Ct. of the First Instance of Brussels Feb.
15, 2007).
250. Id. at 31-32.
251. Id. at 28.
252. Of course, the search results will be viewable in other countries. This means that Google's distribution
of a few sentences from a book to a user in another country must be analyzed under that country's copyright
laws. (Google arguably is causing a copy of the sentences to be made in the random access memory of the
user's computer.) While the copyright laws of most countries might not be so generous as to allow the repro-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Eldred, the fair use doctrine acts as one of copyright
law's built-in accommodations to the First Amendment. Hence, it is particularly
fitting that two of Google's endeavors that advance First Amendment values-its
search engine and Library Project-depend on the fair use doctrine for their law-
fulness.253 In contrast, European nations with less developed free speech traditions
lack a fair use analog. These jurisdictions present a hostile copyright environment
to Google's search engine and library project.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
duction of an entire book, almost all copyright laws do permit short quotations. These exceptions for quota-
tions should be sufficient to protect Google's transmission of Library Project search results to users.
253. See supra Parts V-VI.
